Geographic insights
Global
Webpages (URLs) found to display or lead to child sexual abuse in 2025
310,437
Where are the webpages being hosted?
When we identify child sexual abuse content online, our priority is to have it removed from the internet as quickly as possible. To achieve this, we trace the URL to determine the location of the physical server hosting the content. This allows us to identify the appropriate partners to work with and the country in which action needs to be taken.
Once the content is removed from the physical server (the original source) we can be confident that it has also been removed from any websites that were linking to it, such as blogs, forums or image-hosting platforms.
Below is a breakdown of all criminal URLs found to show or lead to child sexual abuse (310,437 in 2025) broken down by continent. Note that there are a number of reports not included here as they don’t feature a URL (for example most Child Reporting Services reports).
Total actioned child sexual abuse material URLs by continent
Total actioned criminal (CSAM) reports by continent
Europe continues to be the largest host of criminal URLs we action.
Global hosting by country
| Host Country | Number of URLs | % of Total Number of URLs | % Last Year | % Point Change | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bulgaria | 87,959 | 28% | 9% | +19% | 🡹 |
| United States | 49,021 | 16% | 14% | +2% | 🡹 |
| Netherlands | 33,788 | 11% | 29% | -18% | 🡻 |
| Romania | 21,188 | 7% | 7% | +0% | 🡹 |
| France | 20,475 | 7% | 1% | +6% | 🡹 |
| Germany | 18,401 | 6% | 2% | +4% | 🡹 |
| Malaysia | 17,046 | 5% | 5% | +0% | 🡹 |
| Moldova | 9,941 | 3% | 3% | +0% | 🡹 |
| Iceland | 7,455 | 2% | 0% | +2% | 🡹 |
| Sweden | 6,820 | 2% | 1% | +1% | 🡹 |
| Russian Federation | 5,797 | 2% | 2% | +0% | 🡹 |
| Panama | 5,275 | 2% | 1% | +1% | 🡹 |
| Iran | 5,083 | 2% | - | 0% | - |
| Ukraine | 4,987 | 2% | 2% | +0% | 🡹 |
| Vietnam | 3,344 | 1% | 0% | +1% | 🡹 |
| Lithuania | 1,985 | 1% | 3% | -2% | 🡻 |
| Hong Kong | 1,959 | 1% | 8% | -7% | 🡻 |
| Finland | 1,414 | 0% | 0% | +0% | 🡹 |
| Poland | 1,216 | 0% | 3% | -2% | 🡻 |
| Slovak Republic | 1,029 | 0% | 1% | -1% | 🡻 |
| India | 982 | 0% | 0% | +0% | 🡹 |
| United Kingdom | 950 | 0% | 0% | -0% | 🡻 |
| Onion URL (Dark web) | 705 | 0% | 0% | +0% | 🡹 |
| Estonia | 596 | 0% | 0% | +0% | 🡹 |
| Latvia | 518 | 0% | 3% | -2% | 🡻 |
| Azerbaijan | 446 | 0% | 0% | -0% | 🡻 |
| Luxembourg | 370 | 0% | 0% | -0% | 🡻 |
| Singapore | 266 | 0% | 0% | -0% | 🡻 |
| Japan | 219 | 0% | 0% | -0% | 🡻 |
| Czech Republic | 215 | 0% | 3% | -2% | 🡻 |
| Indonesia | 198 | 0% | 0% | -0% | 🡻 |
| Switzerland | 119 | 0% | 0% | -0% | 🡻 |
| Korea (South) | 94 | 0% | 0% | -0% | 🡻 |
| Serbia | 64 | 0% | - | 0% | - |
| Canada | 40 | 0% | 0% | -0% | 🡻 |
| Italy | 39 | 0% | 0% | -0% | 🡻 |
| United Arab Emirates | 37 | 0% | 0% | -0% | 🡻 |
| Iraq | 36 | 0% | - | 0% | - |
| Laos | 34 | 0% | - | 0% | - |
| South Africa | 30 | 0% | - | +0% | 🡹 |
| Seychelles | 30 | 0% | - | +0% | 🡹 |
| Austria | 27 | 0% | 2% | -2% | 🡻 |
| Bosnia-Herzegovina | 26 | 0% | 0% | 0% | - |
| Spain | 25 | 0% | 0% | 0% | - |
| Norway | 22 | 0% | 0% | -0% | 🡻 |
| Albania | 22 | 0% | 0% | +0% | 🡹 |
| Brazil | 19 | 0% | 0% | 0% | - |
| Hungary | 16 | 0% | 0% | 0% | - |
| Thailand | 13 | 0% | - | 0% | - |
| Australia | 13 | 0% | 0% | 0% | - |
| China | 11 | 0% | 0% | 0% | - |
| Cambodia | 11 | 0% | - | 0% | - |
| Croatia | 10 | 0% | - | 0% | - |
| Mauritius | 8 | 0% | 0% | 0% | - |
| Denmark | 7 | 0% | 0% | 0% | - |
| Belize | 7 | 0% | - | 0% | - |
| Israel | 5 | 0% | - | 0% | - |
| Bangladesh | 5 | 0% | 0% | 0% | - |
| Armenia | 4 | 0% | - | 0% | - |
| Turkey | 3 | 0% | 0% | -0% | 🡻 |
| Mexico | 2 | 0% | 0% | 0% | - |
| Chile | 2 | 0% | - | 0% | - |
| Uruguay | 1 | 0% | - | 0% | - |
| Taiwan | 1 | 0% | 0% | 0% | - |
| Slovenia | 1 | 0% | - | 0% | - |
| Nigeria | 1 | 0% | - | 0% | - |
| Montenegro | 1 | 0% | 0% | 0% | - |
| Kazakhstan | 1 | 0% | 0% | 0% | - |
| Ireland | 1 | 0% | 0% | 0% | - |
| Cyprus | 1 | 0% | 0% | 0% | - |
| Overall Total | 310,437 | 100% | 100% |
We have added +/- to reflect the movement in percentage point terms (increase or decrease) on the previous year’s figures.
In 2025, hosting patterns of criminal URLs actioned by our analysts shifted globally, with notable increases in Bulgaria (up 19 percentage points), France (up 6 points), and Germany (up 4 points), while the Netherlands saw a significant decline of 18 percentage points and Hong Kong experienced a 7 point decrease.
Some countries consistently rank high on this list, likely due to the scale and accessibility of their hosting infrastructure. Fluctuations in the numbers can happen for many reasons, including when illegal sites move between countries, how quickly sites are taken down, the types of sites involved and where analysts focus for proactive work.
The recent rise in the number of criminal websites hosted in Bulgaria is the result of just a few particular sites and does not necessarily indicate a wider problem in the country. The drop in the Netherlands is likely because of effective monitoring and fast takedowns, rather than a decrease in hosting capacity.
Some readers may find the following descriptions distressing, please feel free to skip this section.
International
When we seek the removal of child sexual abuse material that has been reported, we spot patterns. Patterns such as how websites move from one hosting provider to another to keep child sexual abuse material visible. We notice the hosts that are more commonly used than others for hosting child sexual abuse. We also learn which hosts, in which countries, are more receptive to our requests to remove this material.
We can draw some conclusions about which platforms or countries are “more prone” to abuse, and we are seeing a rise in international hosting. In our experience, this growth reflects a more connected world, the increasing reliability of servers in developing regions, and the lower-cost hosting options that may be a result of this expanding market.
There are more factors to consider when reporting child sexual abuse material that is hosted internationally: legal parameters in that country, language barriers or a company structure that may make it hard to find the appropriate contact to which to send notices. We make sure that we continue to take action on child sexual abuse material regardless of where it is hosted.
We recognise that many providers have little idea how their services are being misused, and that content removal happens more quickly when we can work with the right people overseeing these hosting companies.
When we explain that an image of a child abused in Europe and circulated across the Americas is hosted on a server in Asia, it becomes clear how borderless and global the issue of revictimisation is.
Keywords
As analysts, we understand that some of the darkest parts of the internet exist on some of the world’s most popular platforms. We recognise the internet isn’t confined by borders, and the intelligence that we collect shouldn’t be either. Whether it be a new term emerging, a platform shift or a particular way that offenders communicate, this global intelligence feeds directly into one of our most hands-on tools: the IWF Keywords List.
The Keywords List isn’t static; it evolves as we learn, and only an analyst could understand the full context of some of the keywords we use in our work. Keyword terms are not always obvious, they may be slang words or phrases that pertain to child sexual abuse in one language, but when translated to English mean something entirely different. Understanding keywords and the context behind them provides vital clues for how child sexual abuse material is shared online and this intelligence helps us fight its spread and accessibility.
Keyword intelligence is vital to the work we do in-house at the IWF and also to our wider impact through our Members. This year, the expansion of our keywords service has meant fewer missed cues and a clearer path for our Members to intervene in the sharing of child sexual abuse that often occurs in plain sight. This service means intelligence evolves beyond stagnant information, and becomes tangible leads to follow, directly protecting children online regardless of their geographical location.
This year has highlighted that as global connectivity grows and reaches more parts of the world, having services and knowledge that span that breadth is essential. Our mission to protect children isn’t confined to those that speak English, and our international understanding has been key in spanning that reach, making sure no child is left behind regardless of where they are. Protecting children across the globe starts with analysts like us, and our tools reflect that.
EU Member States
More than half 196,101 (63%) of the child sexual abuse URLs (310,437) that we have actioned this year were traced to hosting services in EU Member states.
The table of countries below shows where the servers responsible for hosting the illegal webpages were physically located, at the point when we actioned the illegal content.
EU Member States represent 63% of all identified URLs containing child sexual abuse material.
Hosting across EU Member States
| Host country | Number of URLs | % of total number of URLs | Last Year | % last year | % point change | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bulgaria | 87,959 | 28% | 25,180 | 9% | +19% | 🡹 |
| Netherlands | 33,788 | 11% | 83,037 | 29% | -18% | 🡻 |
| Romania | 21,188 | 7% | 21,528 | 7% | -0% | 🡻 |
| France | 20,475 | 7% | 2,091 | 1% | +6% | 🡹 |
| Germany | 18,401 | 6% | 4,448 | 2% | +4% | 🡹 |
| Sweden | 6,820 | 2% | 1,552 | 1% | +2% | 🡹 |
| Lithuania | 1,985 | 1% | 8,484 | 3% | -2% | 🡻 |
| Finland | 1,414 | 0% | 1,027 | 0% | +0% | 🡹 |
| Poland | 1,216 | 0% | 8,077 | 3% | -2% | 🡻 |
| Slovak Republic | 1,029 | 0% | 3,422 | 1% | -1% | 🡻 |
| Estonia | 596 | 0% | 65 | 0% | +0% | 🡹 |
| Latvia | 518 | 0% | 7,540 | 3% | -2% | 🡻 |
| Luxembourg | 370 | 0% | 486 | 0% | 0% | - |
| Czech Republic | 215 | 0% | 7,859 | 3% | -3% | 🡻 |
| Italy | 39 | 0% | 70 | 0% | 0% | - |
| Austria | 27 | 0% | 6,144 | 2% | -2% | 🡻 |
| Spain | 25 | 0% | 36 | 0% | 0% | - |
| Hungary | 16 | 0% | 27 | 0% | 0% | - |
| Croatia | 10 | 0% | 0 | - | +0% | 🡹 |
| Denmark | 7 | 0% | 3 | 0% | +0% | 🡹 |
| Cyprus | 1 | 0% | 0 | 9% | +0% | 🡹 |
| Ireland | 1 | 0% | 0 | 0% | 0% | - |
| Slovenia | 1 | 0% | 0 | 0% | +0% | 🡹 |
| Total | 196,101 | 63% | 140,911 | 62% | +11% | 🡹 |
We have added +/- to reflect the movement of an increase or decrease on the previous year’s figures.
The top three countries shown in the table account for 73% of hosting within EU Member States.
Some readers may find the following descriptions distressing, please feel free to skip this section.
The IWF continues to enjoy strong relations with partners in Europe and, in the Hotline, we foster close working relationships with our EU counterparts. When European hosting companies are abused by bad actors, we work together to ensure child sexual abuse imagery is removed quickly and efficiently. We regularly share intelligence on how best to pursue a takedown request with a local host, corroborate the tracing of hosting locations and exchange regional knowledge to inform our work.
Europe remains a global hub for internet hosting, offering an extensive network and reliable connectivity. Through regular contact with hosts and other industry associates in Europe, we seek to build effective alliances and maximise our positive impact on takedown times.
In instances where a smaller, harder-to-contact hosting company has been abused – or an individual may have maliciously exploited legitimate services to share child sexual abuse material online – we are often able to work with a larger hosting provider further up the infrastructure ‘chain’ to seek the removal of web pages.
As site owners and users can move their content from host to host and even country to country with increasing speed to minimise inconvenience and downtime, it is critical that we remain vigilant and maintain an international outlook, monitoring hosting beyond our own national borders.
The IWF continues to work with EU institutions, Member States, civil society and technology companies to ensure a harmonised and effective framework for the detection, reporting and removal of child sexual abuse material across the EU. In particular, EU policymakers urgently need to pass the Child Sexual Abuse Regulation and recast Directive.
We remain particularly concerned about the large amount of child sexual abuse material that is hosted in the European Union (EU). In 2024, more than half (62%) of child sexual abuse URLs that we actioned were traced to hosting services in EU Member States. In 2025, this rose to 63%. These figures should serve as a clarion call to act: the EU cannot be a safe haven for child sexual abuse material.
The IWF has long worked with EU institutions, Member States, civil society and technology companies to ensure a harmonised and effective framework for the detection, reporting and removal of child sexual abuse material across all EU Member States.
The Child Sexual Abuse Regulation (CSAR) holds the potential to provide a long-term framework for combating child sexual abuse material in the online environment. It is vital that there is a durable legal basis for detection measures. The legislation must include robust risk assessment and mitigation requirements, ensure mandatory reporting and transparency, and establish a well-resourced and authoritative EU Centre capable of harmonising action across Member States, in close coordination with international hotlines, law enforcement and subject-matter experts.
There is strong public backing for decisive action: more than three in five parents believe politicians and technology companies are not doing enough to protect children online, while four in five EU citizens support requiring online service providers to detect, report and remove child sexual abuse material. Recent polling by the IWF showed that nearly nine in 10 adults across Germany, Italy and Poland think their governments should back proposed EU child sexual abuse legislation that seeks to protect children online and ensure that tech companies can detect for images and videos of child sexual abuse on their websites and platforms.
The passage of the recast Child Sexual Abuse Directive (CSA Directive), alongside the CSAR, would ensure a comprehensive framework for criminalising offences and strengthening victim support. The CSA Directive seeks to modernise and harmonise EU-wide legal and procedural standards for the prevention and investigation of child sexual abuse offences across Member States, facilitating cross-border cooperation on prevention, victim support and law enforcement. We particularly support the European Parliament’s strong provisions on the criminalisation of AI-generated child sexual abuse material, as well as models optimised for its production.
The IWF also advocates for strong implementation and enforcement of the Digital Services Act (DSA) to improve accountability for content harmful to children and other users. Child protection must be recognised as high priority in the implementation of the Artificial Intelligence Act, especially regarding the regulation of technologies capable of generating harmful or illegal imagery.
UK
The UK hosts a small volume of online child sexual abuse content.
- 951 were hosted in the UK. This is a decrease of 4% from 987 URLs in 2024.
- Only 0.30% of all actioned reports were hosted in the UK.
- 164 takedown notices relating to the 951 URLs were sent to UK hosting companies. When we see multiple reports or URLs for the same host, we will send one notice for several webpages.
The longer an image remains online, the greater the opportunity for offenders to view and share it, causing further harm to victims, therefore we must act quickly to take action to remove it.
Working in partnership with the online industry, we push for the rapid removal of this content. The ‘takedown’ clock runs from the moment we issue a takedown notice to the hosting provider to the point at which the content is removed.
Fastest removal: 1 minute
UK response time to disable access to illegal material (via URL removal or content removal)
As our chart shows, when we take action against a URL that displays or directs users to child sexual abuse imagery, more than 88% are removed within 24 hours of being reported by us to the UK host.
Some readers may find the following descriptions distressing, please feel free to skip this section.
We have continued to see an increase in the number of hosts – companies whose servers are ‘hosting’ or storing a website’s files so the site can be visited online – which are registered as being owned by one single person.
These individuals, often overseas nationals and residents, use company formation services to provide a legitimate office address and the features of an official UK business. They then create a private limited company based in the UK. Often, they will only keep the company live for a year or two, then close it down.
While active, they appear to lease server capacity from much bigger, legitimate companies. This means that, when tracing the location of the website host, a UK ‘head office’ address may appear while the online content is in fact hosted on a server in a different country. The company has no physical presence in the UK, bar a correspondence address.
These ‘one man’ hosts can be easily spotted by analysts, but if they are hosting child sexual abuse material, seeking its takedown can be frustrating. Locating the true server location often requires navigating multiple layers of obfuscation. Sometimes those larger, legitimate hosts are reluctant to take web pages or sites offline immediately – it’s not unusual for companies to allow their clients a grace period before removing online content from their servers. We also see individuals profiting financially from these ventures, as every ‘hit’ on their site will generate revenue.
We have learnt to recognise these types of hosts and know to dig deeper when we see them. We have also discovered that other hotlines around the world are encountering similar problems locally, and we are working together to establish best-practice approaches.